III. Weltwirtschaft und wirtschaft einzlner länderund und gebiete

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事半功倍：提高创新成功率

波士顿咨询公司曾帮助许多世界领先公司转型创新项目：加强研发和战略之间的关系、削减成本、加快投放市场的时间、以及最重要的是提高成功率。最近,我们的一家客户告诉我们他在一趟欧洲航班上与同行乘客的对话。我们的客户是一家全球汽车供应公司的CEO,乐于谈论公司创新项目的转型历程和其所带来的惊人成果。     

Cross-Industrial User Channel Preferences on the Path to Online Purchase: Homogeneous,Heterogeneous, or Mixed?

Though research literature addresses a broad range of advertising impact models, studies on the channel preferences of online purchasers have received little attention, regarding both multichannel settings and channel interplay in click sequences. To provide advertisers a method for better evaluating customer channel preference, this study investigates the path to purchase by building on four multichannel clickstream data sets from three industries, recorded with cookie-tracking technologies. Applying a Cox model and clustering techniques supports delineation of empirical generalizations and industry-specific findings on channel exposure, including their antecedents and distinct channel click sequences. Across data sets, online users show idiosyncratic channel preferences for a limited set of one or two channels rather than multiple online vehicles. Both channel homogeneous click sequences and combinations of two channels (including branded contacts) are effective as purchase predictors. Our study also presents industry-specific results regarding the influence of click sequences on purchase intent, thereby providing insights for advertising research, particularly as are suited to optimization of online advertising activities.     

The Representation of Social Actors in Corporate Codes of Ethics. How Code Language Positions Internal Actors

This article understands codes of ethics as written documents that represent social actors in specific ways through the use of language. It presents an empirical study that investigated the codes of ethics of the German Dax30 companies. The study adopted a critical discourse analysis-approach in order to reveal how the code-texts produce a particular understanding of the various internal social groups for the readers. Language is regarded as social practice that functions at creating particular understandings of individuals and groups, how they are interrelated, and how they should behave. Findings show that codes of ethics do not represent employees as a group that is empowered or morally enlightened; instead they are positioned as passive receivers of rules and regulations. Furthermore, codes of ethics classify employees as having a need to be monitored and controlled by the higher levels of the corporate hierarchy. Overall, code language enforces compliance through maintaining existing and building new asymmetries between the different groups within a company. As a consequence, the article discusses a somewhat different understanding of code effectiveness. Reproducing and reemphasizing hierarchical relations could also lead to code compliance, perhaps without any need for developing the moral employee that is committed to ethical values.     

The crisis-resilience of services trade

Much attention has been focused on the impact of the current crisis on goods trade; hardly any on its impact on services trade. Using new trade data from the USA, and more aggregate data from other OECD countries, the authors show that services trade is weathering the current crisis much better than goods trade. On the basis of new evidence from Indian services exporters, it is suggested that services trade is more robust relative to goods trade for three reasons: less cyclical demand; lesser dependence on external finance; and few explicitly protectionist measures so far taken in services.     

Domestic concentration,foreign trade and economic performance

In a competitive fringe model the impact of concentration on price-cost margins can be shown to be ambiguous. Therefore, looking at the relationship between rates of return and concentration ratios is not sufficient for perceiving collusive elements. In this paper a model is set up that permits discerning collusion more clearly. Additional evidence concerning collusion can be gained by analyzing the influence of exports and imports on price-cost margins. Applying this approach to West Germany yields the result that the collusiveness prevailing in domestic markets has not visibly decreased in spite of a substantial increase in foreign trade.     

Local Responsive Talent Management for Foreign Multinational Enterprises in China

China evolves with amazing speed to be a leading player in the world economy. However, the transformation from isolated centrally planned to internationally open market economy during the past 25 years has occurred so fast that the change in the mindset and the adaptation of new modern business practice is still in progress. Foreign multinational enterprises in the mainland of China responded to the resulting shortcomings of Chinese professionals and managers by covering the key position in the organization by their own resources or managers from neighbor Asian countries. In this qualitative study, a new local responsive talent management concept for foreign multinational enterprises with expatriated managers was proposed under special consideration of the cultural business environment in China. The establishment of a learning firm culture with advanced training system to compensate the drawbacks of Chinese professionals was outlined. The coverage of the key positions in the organization by Chinese professionals with established social network and optionally supported by temporary foreign advisors was proposed to improve the firm climax, domestic customer and stakeholder relations.     

Incentive Regulation and Competition in Public Utility Markets: A 20-Year Perspective

Over the last 20 years, incentives in general and price caps in particular have breathed new life into public utility regulation. Price caps successfully combine incentives for cost reduction with incentives for more efficient pricing. These properties also facilitate opening public utility sectors to competition. Relatively tight price caps likely imply the right amount of competition, when the underlying natural market structure is unknown. While price caps make a regulated incumbent competitively more aggressive, this aggression is likely to improve on the unregulated outcome. Potentially anticompetitive behavior by the incumbent has led to regulation of essential inputs on the basis of benchmarked costs. Benchmarked costs should evolve into price caps for essential inputs and eventually lead to partial deregulation of end-user prices.     

Effort rewarding incentive mechanisms for public enterprise managers

Management incentive schemes leading to welfare optimal pricing and efficient production of public enterprises have so far been mainly concerned with the information advantages that public enterprise managers hold over their supervising government or central planning agency. Managers under these schemes are induced to improve their firm's performance in adjustment processes which in the limit lead to optimal firm decisions. Such managers are supposed to be income maximizers disregarding any personal effort which could influence their performance and utility. In this paper I show that two incentive schemes recently proposed by Tam (1981) and Finsinger and Vogelsang (1982) can also help to induce managers to provide an optimal level of effort. Here effort is assumed to reduce managers' utility and the firm's costs. The result depends crucially on myopic managerial utility maximization. Once managers maximize the discounted value of future utility levels they will deviate from the optimal behavior. Under Tam's scheme, this can hold independent of the optimal effort level. Under the Finsinger-Vogelsang performance index managers will always show suboptimal effort levels in a steady state equilibrium, because the index only rewards welfare improvements.Effort, however, has to be rewarded even with no improvement in behavior. An improved performance index, which provides cumulative rewards is shown to be strategy proof and lead to a welfare optimum. This reward structure basically treats managers as if they were private entrepreneurs. It looks extremely generous in that it gives managers the fruits of all costs reductions due to increases in effort. Suggestions are made to mitigate this income distributional impact.